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Abstract 
 
While crowdsourcing has become increasingly popular 
among organizations, it also has become increasingly 
susceptible to unethical and malicious activities. This 
paper discusses recent examples of disruptive and 
deceptive efforts on crowdsourcing sites, which 
impacted the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the crowdsourcing efforts’ service, stakeholders, 
and data. From these examples, we derive an 
organizing framework of risk types associated with 
disruption and deception in crowdsourcing based on 
commonalities among incidents. The framework 
includes prank activities, the intentional placement of 
false information, hacking attempts, DDoS attacks, 
botnet attacks, privacy violation attempts, and data 
breaches. Finally, we discuss example controls that 
can assist in identifying and mitigating disruption and 
deception risks in crowdsourcing.  
 
1. Introduction  
Organizations can use crowdsourcing to take “a 
function once performed by employees and outsour-
cing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of 
people in the form of an open call” [27]. Crowd-
sourcing has emerged as a viable alternative business 
model that focuses on problem solving and production 
provided by the distributed network of individuals [8]. 
It potentially has many benefits [26][7][12][6]: It can 
be more cost-effective than having traditional 
employees perform certain tasks.  It enables 
organizations to get access to a wide and varied 
collection of opinions and ideas, which can reduce bias 
in decision-making. It allows organizations and 
governments to directly engage with customers and 
citizen. Although crowdsourcing is still evolving as an 
organizational and societal phenomenon, its potential 
demonstrated is by data from the crowdsourcing 
market: 15 major crowd service providers almost 
tripled their revenues from US$140.80Min 2009 to 
US$375.70M in 2011 and the global enterprise 
crowdsourcing market growth rate reported 75% 
growth in 2011 compared to 53% in 2010 [33]. 
Yet, several challenges threaten the usefulness of 
crowdsourcing as a reliable organizational problem 
solving approach. For example, there are challenges 
concerning the ownership of crowdsourced products or 
the perceived lack of quality standards related to 
crowdsourced goods or services [31][17]. Moreover, 
recently crowdsourcing sites have emerged with the 
intention of causing harm online. A rapid increase in 
malicious crowdsourcing service sites (also known as 
crowdturfing sites) has been observed in countries like 
China, the US, and India [50]. Such sites recruit 
individuals that for a small payment post false negative 
restaurant reviews, write biased political comments, or 
post false advertising [51]. There are also examples of 
legitimate initiatives that have been attacked by 
individuals seeking to achieve profits from exploiting 
the crowd-sourcing ventures: In 2016 users posted 
false reports of blocked road traffic in their 
neighborhoods on a crowdsourced app Waze to deflect 
some of the traffic flow from the places where their 
lived [24].  
As crowdsourcing is increasingly becoming one of 
the ways in which organizations execute projects and 
support decision-making, disruptive and deceptive use 
of and responses to crowdsourcing initiatives need to 
be better understood and mitigated. It is unclear what 
harm might be caused to individuals and organizations 
by potential deception in crowdsourcing. For example, 
scholars are also unsure how disruptive the effects of 
crowdsourcing pranks and deceptions are on 
organizations. It is also unclear what are the physical 
or emotional effects of deceptive or violated 
crowdsourcing efforts on its contributors or 
beneficiaries.  
Both crowdsourcers and crowdsourcing providers 
must be aware of existing threats and threats that may 
develop in the future. Currently, the biggest challenge 
that crowdsourcing providers and consumers faces 
concerns the number of crowd participants whose 
malicious behavior is difficult to detect and control 
[12]. Thus, the primary motivation for this study is to 
understand intentional disruptive and deceptive 
behavior in crowdsourcing contexts. Our main 
objective is to identify emerging risks that are related 
to crowdsourcing deception. We discuss recent 
examples where crowdsourcing websites were attacked 
or abused by malicious activities. Finally, we propose 
an organizing framework of risks that result from these 
security violations and deception cases.  
This paper is structured as follows. First, we 
discuss previous research on disruption and deception 
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in crowdsourcing environments. Next, we present our 
study’s method. We then present the categorization of 
the identified disruption and deception incidents and 
analyze the identified cases using defined risk pattern 
clusters according to the CIA triad. We discuss 
potential controls ways to mitigate the identified 
issues. Finally, we discuss the implications of the 
study, its limitations, and directions for future research. 
 
2. Background  
Past research on cyber threats and deception in 
crowdsourcing has focused on different issues. For 
example, Dwarakanath et al. [14] focused on crowd 
trustworthiness in crowdsourced software development 
initiatives. They proposed a taxonomy of 
trustworthiness and existing methods to build trust in a 
crowd. They showed that macro-tasks that require 
specific skills are related to a high level of 
untrustworthiness. They also found that workers’ poor 
reputation had a strong impact on trustworthiness. 
Other findings showed little correlation between 
monetary benefits and trustworthiness.  
Stefanovich et al. [43] analyzed the ability of 
crowdsourcing systems to cope with attacks. Based on 
the data collected from DARPA’s Shredder Challenge, 
the researchers identified attack mechanisms and 
analyzed how users recover from such attacks. They 
argued that while participants can recover from errors 
in the long term, the attacks still affected participants: 
after being attacked, participants develop a notion of 
not being able to influence malicious behavior. It thus 
appears that victims of malicious behavior often suffer 
from motivational challenges to get involved in tasks. 
Consequently, their task efficiency tends to drop as 
well. Lasecki et al. [31] found similar motivational 
challenges as a result of crowdsourcing threats: they 
found that the more malicious tasks appear in a 
crowdsourcing environment, the less willing users are 
to participate in such tasks. Their study further showed 
that even simple tasks are subject to online 
manipulation and can be a target for information 
distraction. 
Harris [22] raised the issue of ethics in 
crowdsourcing design and analyzed the examples of 
crowdsourcing initiatives that intentionally would not 
conform to ethical standards. In his study, he examined 
how crowdsourcing contributes to population of 
unethical behaviors and activities such as posting fake 
online reviews. In the same online reviewing context, 
Fayazi et al. [16] investigated how to uncover 
crowdsourced manipulation. The researchers created a 
sampling method to track down items, which received 
manipulated online reviews. Their method also aims at 
identifying and removing users who post false reviews 
from affected crowdsourcing platforms. Similarly, 
Chen et al. [10] described crowdsourcing tasks where 
the provision of new information (exploration) is often 
distorted and exploited, because the verification part of 
a crowdsourced task is neglected. The researchers built 
an agent-based model that helped them balance 
exploitation and exploration in crowdsourced search 
tasks where time plays a critical role.  
Crowdsourcing users can also create fake identities 
(Sybils), which, when multiplied, can be used to boost 
the perpetrators’ reputation. Cheng et al. [11] presented 
a frame-work to assess robustness of reputation 
mechanism to Sybils. Like flagging fake identities, 
researchers have also focused on flagging fake or 
inappropriate content. Kayes et al. [29] built a 
classifier that detects abusive users of community-
based question/answering platforms. Their findings 
show that flagging suspicious content by the users 
works effectively as a crowdsourced monitoring 
function. Moreover, the researchers found that flagged 
users received more attention but often were not 
perceived as toxic to the community. On the contrary, 
flagged users who posted questions received a higher 
than average level of response compared to questions 
posted by ordinary users.  
Finally, Wolfson et al. [53] analyzed data security-
related areas, where crowdsourcing and the law are 
likely to intersect in the near future. They discuss 
possible challenges related to the deployment of 
crowdsourcing and claims that crowdsourcing misuse 
is highly tied to issues with data security.  
As can be seen, research on cyber threats and 
deception in crowdsourcing is fragmented. Apart from 
the separate studies on cyber and deception threats to 
crowdsourcing discussed above, we were unable to 
identify any study exploring the scope of the problem 
or addressing the problem from a holistic perspective 
by taking a full range of threats into consideration. The 
next section describes our research method to collect 
and analyze practical examples of cyber threats and 
deception in crowdsourcing in order to develop a holis-
tic framework of the different types of such threats. 
 
3. Method 
The development of a structured overview of cyber 
threats and deception in crowdsourcing took place in 
three steps. Each step is detailed below. 
 
3.1 Crowdsourcing organizing framework 
We first conceptualized a crowdsourcing effort in 
terms of the relevant elements that can be 
distinguished. The purpose of this conceptualization is 
to collect relevant information about examples of 
malicious crowdsourcing efforts. Thus, our 
conceptualization is an example of a Theory for 
Analyzing, which is “used to classify specific 
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dimensions or characteristics… by summarizing the 
commonalities found in discrete observations… when 
nothing or very little is known about the phenomenon 
in question” [21]. Our conceptualization is based on 
past definitions of crowdsourcing (e.g. [27]), previous 
models (e.g. [38]), and past research (e.g. [14]).  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptualization of a 
crowdsourcing effort. 
 
Our conceptual model of a crowdsourcing effort 
consists of the following elements (Figure 1): 
• Crowdsourcing Task: The work assignment for 
which contributions are solicited. Crowdsourcing 
tasks are also referred to as problems or challenges. 
We captured information that would characterize the 
task that was at the center of a deceptive 
crowdsourcing incident. 
• Crowd: The individuals (crowd workers) who 
perform the task. In the deceptive crowdsourcing 
context, crowd-related issues concern malicious 
human behavior as well as the identification of 
mechanisms that might initiate such behavior. 
• Crowdsourcing Platform: Connects the crowd and 
problem owner. When capturing crowdsourcing de-
ception examples, we focus on risks and vulnera-
bilities related to the platform or its management.  
• Problem Owner: Defines a task, posts it on a 
platform, and provides data and tools for task 
completion. For our analysis, we focus on 
information related to the problem-owner’s context 
concerning risks that were initiated by problem 
owners or caused by their negligence. 
• Governance: The policies, reward structures, and 
moderation of the crowdsourcing effort. We 
collected information on the governance mechanisms 
used in the incidents and related vulnerabilities, e.g. 
lack of quality control. 
• Crowd Contributions: Outputs from crowd members 
when they have completed their tasks. We captured 
information regarding potentially disruptive or 
deceptive input, e.g. intentionally false information, 
and its’ effects on the crowdsourcing results.  
 
3.2 Identification of deceptive crowdsourcing 
incidents 
Next, we conducted a search for examples of deceptive 
crowdsourcing incidents. We scoped our search as 
follows. First, we focused on examples from academic 
or practice publications, including web publications, 
from the last 10 years. As crowdsourcing is a relatively 
young phenomenon, we did not expect to find 
examples that go back earlier than 2007. Second, we 
focused only on legitimate (legal) crowdsourcing 
efforts that had become target or victim of malicious 
intent. During our search, we found examples of a 
distinct type of malicious crowdsourcing called 
“crowdturfing” [50][51], where the effort is 
purposefully organized to cause harm. Crowdturfing 
problem owners reward a crowd to perform malicious 
activities, e.g. putting negative comments on 
competitors’ products’ websites. Yet, our focus is on 
crowdsourcing efforts that fall victim of malicious 
activities, such as cybersecurity breaches or deception.  
To find examples of incidents, we performed a wide 
search using academic (Google Scholar, ABI/INFORM 
Global) and general (Google) online search engines. We 
determined search terms in two steps: We first identified 
search terms that we felt would best reflect our 
phenomenon of interest. Then, from the relevant 
publications we found, we identified additional synonyms 
and other content search terms. We performed a final 
search with the additional terms to find further 
publications. Our final search terms list includes terms 
such as “crowdsourcing deception”, “crowdsourcing 
threats”, “cybersecurity crowd-sourcing”, “open 
innovation challenges”, “online labor market challenges”, 
“public participation gone bad”, “online contest gone 
bad”, “hacking of crowdsourcing webpages”, 
“crowdsourcing controversy”, and combi-nations of 
constituent terms. For each example that we identified, we 
collected available information per the elements of our 
conceptual model. As our objective was not to create a 
comprehensive library of every reported incident, we did 
not capture information on incidents that could be 
considered identical in nature as others that we recorded 
already. For example, descriptions of malicious prank 
attempts on crowdsourcing websites are relatively 
common so we only included a few in our set of incidents. 
 
3.3 Extracting deceptive crowdsourcing types 
For the final step we looked for commonalities among 
the different incidents that we recorded to identify 
distinct types of cyber threats to crowdsourcing. Next, 
we used the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability 
(CIA) triad to sort the threat types in terms of what part 
of the triad was at risk. We used the CIA triad as this 
one of the most popular cybersecurity frameworks. 
Crowd	
Crowdsourcing	
Pla0orm	
Crowdsourcing	
Task	
Crowd	
Contribu6ons	
Governance	 Problem	Owner	
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Next, we defined specific risks involved in each type 
of crowdsourcing threat and for outlining examples of 
controls that can assist in preventing the risk or 
mitigating the risk’s impact when it materializes. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Crowdsourcing incidents 
Our search of publications and online sources yielded a 
variety of real-case incidents that are detailed in 
Appendix A. We included 18 incidents in this 
overview; similar incidents were left out due to page 
limitations. For each incident we captured relevant 
information from the publication or online source 
according to the elements of our conceptual model.  
The overview of the incidents shows that half of the 
Confidentiality-related incidents were related to 
privacy violations caused by the placement of sensitive 
data online. All incidents related to Integrity breaches 
were caused by the placement of false information 
intending to gain profit, willingness to make other 
participants lose, or disruption of crowdsourcing 
initiative using prank information. The only malicious 
incident type identified as an Availability-issue was 
related to DDoS attacks, which intend to disrupt the 
secure flow of information. Table 1 gives an overview. 
We realize that the identified collection of 
malicious and deceptive activities is unlikely to be 
exhaustive. Companies that fell victim to deceptive 
crowdsourcing efforts may be reluctant to publicly 
share information about the experience. Still, the 
collected incidents show an interesting pattern. We 
observe that all cases were either related to the 
placement of false information, sharing of sensitive 
information, the disruption of secure information flow 
or intentional deceptive action aimed at undermining 
crowdsourcing initiatives. User deception by 
provisioning of false information, disrupting the 
content of correct information or denying access to 
correct information appeared to be most common. 
 
4.2 Confidentiality risks and controls 
A further analysis of the incidents that are related to 
confidentiality resulted in two types of malicious 
crowdsourcing risks. The first concerns the hacking of 
crowdsourcing sites. Crowdsourcing sites appear to get 
hacked for the same reasons as other online services, 
e.g., theft of sensitive data such as user names, email 
addresses, and shipping addresses. For example, 
criminals hacked Kickstarter to collect sensitive data 
including passwords, phone numbers, email addresses, 
and credit card details. The crowdfunding site Patreon 
was hacked for user names and their addresses. When 
considering the risks related to hacking crowdsourcing 
sites, there are at least two consequences to the 
disclosure of sensitive and private data. First, there 
may be financial implications due to penalties that the 
site owner might need to pay if the information gets 
hacked. Second, there will be reputational damage, as 
the hack will cause a loss of trust among existing and 
future crowd members and problem owners. Controls 
for this risk should aim to prevent successful hacking 
attempts and, if a hack has taken place, limit its impact. 
To mitigate hacking-related risks, the crowdsourcing 
field should focus on technological measures (e.g. 
regular platform patching, encryption of information 
stored on website servers), behavioral measures (e.g. 
implement strong password policies), and governance 
measures (e.g. recovery plans, communication plans, 
and limited collection of personal information).  
The second type of Confidentiality risks is related 
to privacy violations through voluntary sharing of 
personal data. For example, Netflix released anonymi-
zed user records as part of its “Netflix Prize” Contest. 
The PatientsLikeMe website users’ personal data on 
taken medications and illness symptoms was scraped 
by Nielsen and used for further business analysis. Both 
incidents refer to the disclosure of sensitive data, which 
can cause risks such as the violation of privacy of 
crowd members, harm the site’s reputation, and result 
in penalties imposed on website owners. 
Examples of controls to prevent privacy violation 
cases include the verification of information that is 
sourced from non-official channels, regular education 
of users on ways to protect sensitive data or enabling 
corrective forms on the site so that users who spot 
inappropriate data can flag it accordingly. 
 
4.3 Integrity risks and controls 
Our analysis of the integrity-related incidents revealed 
four distinct types. The first type concerns the 
intentional placement of false information with the goal 
to increase the perpetrator’s gains and expose victims to 
potential harm. In this situation, victims are often 
unaware that they have been wronged. For example, 
when someone enters false information on a traffic site 
to move traffic away from their neighborhood, others’ 
trips may be rerouted causing unnecessary delays that 
they are unaware of. Risks related to this type include 
the crowdsourcing site being perceived unreliable over 
time causing users to cease contributing to it. Controls 
should primarily focus on preventing false information 
being submitted and minimizing the consequence of 
false information. Examples of such controls include the 
analysis of recurring patterns for data input, analysis of 
outliers or inconsistent data, cross referencing of entered 
information with other data sources, and policies focus 
on swift removal of user profiles who were caught 
entering false information. 
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Table 1 Identified risks types and controls objectives 
Type Risk description Control objective Control examples 
C1. Hacking 
crowdsourcing site 
(e.g., theft of private 
information) 
Loss of trust among stakeholders; 
financial loss; reputational loss 
impacting future investors decisions; 
penalties if the information gets 
stolen 
Reduction of successful 
hacking attempts. 
Reduction of hacking 
impact/recovery planning 
effort 
Regular patching of platform software and user applications that support the 
crowdsourced service; strong password policy; continuous education of all 
stakeholders on avoiding hacker attacks; recovery plans/ communication plans, 
regularly reviewed; encryption of private information; reduce amount of PII 
data collected 
C2. Privacy violation Legal privacy violation due to 
sharing of unverified or sensitive 
information between the crowd 
members; reputational loss; 
regulatory or legal penalties 
Prevention of privacy 
violation cases 
Verification of information sourced from non-official channels; prevention of 
sensitive data sharing; providing forms to report inappropriate data; regular user 
education on sensitive data protection 
I1. Placement of false 
information (e.g., 
rerouting of the traffic) 
– perpetrator gains, 
victim is exposed to 
potential harm or might 
not be aware that has 
been victimized 
Website becomes unreliable, users 
might not be willing to use the 
service any more 
Preventing the spread of 
false information; 
Minimization of the 
damage brought by false 
information 
Keeping the data consistent 
and accurate – in case the 
issues are found the data is 
rectified  
Analysis of recurring patterns for data input; analysis of outliers/ inconsistent 
data; identification of instances where the entry of false data is possible; 
monitoring and assessment of crowd behavior; flagging type of controls – 
people can report false information; cross referencing of entered information 
with other data sources, e.g., traffic reports; introduction of policies that allow 
the removal of users who were caught with entering false data; introduction of 
delay between collecting the information and posting it on the website; limiting 
the number of entries from a single user/ single area and reviewing the 
information that comes from the same source 
I2. Placement of false 
information to make 
others lose or to cause 
harm to others (e.g., 
competitions) 
Website becomes unreliable, users 
might not be willing to use the 
service anymore; 
Financial losses are likely to follow 
Preventing the input and/or 
the dissemination of false 
information; minimization 
of disinformation efforts; 
keeping the data consistent 
and accurate 
Monitoring and assessment of crowd behavior; monitoring of inconsistencies in 
information inputs; online monitoring – statistical sampling techniques; 
allowing participants to raise concerns in case they spot problems on a 
webpage; introduction of immediate action that follows false information entry, 
e.g., perpetrators are banned and their profiles are removed from the system; 
verification of identity before users post information or take part in competition 
I3. Botnet attack to 
bring false results, e.g. 
placement of false 
traffic information 
Website becomes unreliable, users 
might not be willing to use the 
service anymore; Financial losses 
are likely to follow 
Keeping the data consistent 
and accurate 
Continuous automated data checks, recognition of suspicious patterns; 
implementation of technological solutions that identify or prevent automatic 
scripting; use of analytics to recognize patterns, to analyze where the site is 
approached from and to monitor Internet traffic 
I4. Prank activity in 
crowdsourcing contests 
The crowd that places wrong or 
erroneous information ‘for fun’ puts 
the organizer at risk of needing to 
retract the contest. Financial losses 
and damage of the organizer’s 
credibility are likely to occur 
Keeping the data consistent 
and accurate 
Monitoring and assessing crowd behavior; verification of user’s identity before 
they can post information on a website or take part in an online competition; 
remove false information; banning people; enabling of possibility to flag 
suspicious content by users 
A1. Botnet attack 
(DDoS) 
DDoS attacks negatively impact 
availability and performance of 
crowdsourcing sites and can lead to 
negative financial consequences as 
well as destroy the image of the site 
Prevention of DDoS 
attacks; early detection of 
DDoS attacks; reduction of 
impact of DDoS attacks  
Reactive: Event monitoring of hosting infrastructure, rerouting of unwanted 
internet traffic, continuous automated data checks, recognition of suspicious 
network flow patterns; Proactive: installation of firewalls, monitoring the 
history of network flows, deployment of multiple Internet Service Providers, 
recovery plan in place in case the attacks cannot be prevented 
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The second type concerns the placement of false infor-
mation to make other crowd members lose or to cause 
harm. This type occurred several times at DARPA 
crowdsourced competitions. The competition results 
were affected as perpetrators entered false information 
to frustrate other competitors’ work on the 
crowdsourced tasks. The key risk related to such action 
concerns crowdsourcing efforts becoming unreliable so 
that users become reluctant to use the service. Controls 
to mitigate this risk focus on preventing the 
dissemination of false information, minimizing 
disinformation efforts, and maintaining consistency 
and accuracy of information that has already been 
uploaded. Control activities include monitoring and 
assessing crowd behavior, monitoring for inconsisten-
cies in contributions, and assessing selected contribu-
tions using statistical sampling techniques. Also, 
controls could be considered that allow crowd 
members to raise concerns when they spot problems. 
Individuals making false contributions should be 
banned immediately and their profiles and contribu-
tions should be removed from the system. Another 
control concerns identity verification before users are 
allowed to post information or enter in a competition. 
The third type concerns the placement of false 
information on a crowdsourcing site through botnet 
attacks. This type is different from the previous two 
because of the technological nature of this type of 
threat. Waze was hit by a botnet attack when students 
created false automated profiles to influence traffic 
information and reroute the traffic. The main risk 
related to malicious automated behavior is that 
websites become unreliable so that users no longer use 
the services anymore. Possible controls to mitigate 
botnet attacks include analytics to recognize patterns in 
registration and data input and technological solutions 
that identify or prevent automatic scripting.  
The last Integrity-type concerns prank activities. 
Crowd members may contribute wrong, erroneous, or 
even objectionable information “for fun”. This may 
force the problem owner to retract the contest. 
Consequently, financial losses and damages to the 
organizer’s credibility are likely to occur. The 
following controls can assist in keeping data consistent 
and accurate: monitoring and assessment of crowd 
behavior, user identity verification before allowing 
participation in the contest or making contributions, 
swift removal of false information, and enabling users 
to flag suspicious content by other users. 
 
4.4 Availability risks and controls  
The only availability type that emerged from our 
collection of incidents concerns DDoS attacks caused by 
botnets. An example is project on Crowdsourced 
Satellite Imagery, which was taken down by a botnet 
DDoS attack. Risks related to DDoS botnet attacks 
include limited availability and performance of the 
crowdsourcing site resulting in financial and reputational 
loss. Reactive controls include event monitoring of the 
hosting infrastructure, rerouting unwanted Internet 
traffic, continuous automated data checks, and monito-
ring suspicious network flow patterns. Proactive control 
examples include firewalls, monitoring the history of 
network flows, deploying multiple ISPs, and creating 
recovery plans in case of successful attacks. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to identify emerging 
risks related to disruptive and deceptive behavior in 
crowdsourcing contexts. Through an extensive search 
of academic and online sources, we gathered recent 
examples of incidents where crowdsourcing sites were 
attacked or abused. We identified the CIA element at 
risk for each incident. We observed that most unique 
real-life incidents were related to intentional deceptive 
actions such as placement of prank information, 
placement of false information, unauthorized disclosu-
re of sensitive information or disruption of the secure 
flow of information. Based on the collected incidents, 
we derived an organizing framework of distinct risk 
types concerning disruptive and deceptive crowdsour-
cing. The framework consists of two risk types for 
Confidentiality issues, four risk types for Integrity 
issues, and one type for Availability issues. The 
framework further outlines possible controls to 
mitigate the risk types in terms of preventing the risks 
or containing the damage once the risks materialize.  
Our findings have implications for research in 
crowdsourcing deception and cybersecurity. Crowd-
sourcing threats appear to be predominantly related to 
social engineering attacks. Descriptions of deceptive 
activities dominated in our collection of incidents. This 
shows a need for more in-depth research on human 
factors related to the motivations and behaviors of 
cybercriminals and cyber perpetrators that target 
crowdsourcing. For this purpose, the framework that 
we developed provides an initial outline for a 
structured research program into the nature and effects 
of malicious and deceptive crowdsourcing activities. 
The framework can assist categorizing past research 
and identifying gaps to be addressed in future studies. 
Furthermore, it can be used as a starting point for 
researchers theorizing about antecedents to malicious 
and deceptive behavior in crowdsourcing. Furthermore, 
through the future collection of crowdsourcing 
incidents, the framework can help identify 
commonalities between certain types of incidents in 
terms of behavioral and contextual factors.  
From a practical perspective, the incident examples 
and organizing framework can provide guidance for 
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organizations that are considering using crowdsourcing 
for their business needs and for crowdsourcing 
providers to assess and strengthen their control 
framework to mitigate deception threats. For instance, 
results indicate that risks are predominantly linked to 
reputational and/or financial loss. Both Confidentiality 
risk types refer to privacy violation risks that are likely 
to damage a crowdsourcing platform’s reputation and 
result in fines. The Integrity risk types are related to the 
loss of reliability and reputation that crowdsourcing 
platforms face when their sites are flooded with false 
information. This will ultimately cause users to 
abandon them. The Availability risk type impacts 
platform performance and directly leads to loss of 
profits due to the unavailability of a crowdsourcing 
site. Another practical implication relates to the need 
for the crowdsourcing industry to consider setting up a 
mechanism through which they can (anonymously) 
share cyber and deception incidents. An organized 
library of incidents will support learning about 
potential risks and will ultimately strengthen the 
security of the industry as a whole. For instance, a 
secured platform to collect crowdsourcing deception 
incidents would assist businesses to learn to recognize 
and avert deceptive actions. 
A key limitation of our study is that we likely were 
not able to collect an exhaustive set of incidents. First, 
crowdsourcing is still a relatively new phenomenon so 
additional risk types may emerge in the near future. 
Second, organizations may be aware of the occurrence 
of deceptive actions so incidents go unreported. 
Finally, some organizations are likely to be reluctant in 
sharing detailed information on incidents out of 
competitive and reputational considerations. 
Future research directions include addressing the 
limitations of this study by expanding the collection of 
incidents through interviews with crowdsourcing service 
providers. Also, future research may focus on issues 
such as the extent to which risk awareness deters 
organizations from employing crowdsourcing, whether 
certain tasks are more vulnerable to deception than 
others, and whether crowdsourcing efforts are more 
vulnerable to deception in certain cultures than others. 
Finally, theoretical research could investigate the under-
lying cognitive mechanisms why people who aim to 
deceive others online, e.g., why do people post false 
information and what are the reasons for choosing crow-
dsourcing crowds as target victims? Such research could 
be informed by criminology theories such as General 
Strain Theory or Routine Activities Theory [25].  
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Type & Task description Crowd Crowdsourcing 
Platform 
Problem 
owner 
Governance Crowd 
Contributions 
CIA Triad Source 
I1. Sybil attack – people posting false 
data on crowdsourced map system 
Waze 
Users posted false reports of a wreck, 
speed trap or other blockage in their 
neighborhoods to deflect some of the 
traffic flow 
The app detected 
a saboteur only 
after two weeks 
of daily false 
information posts 
   Integrity – wrong data was 
put into the system to 
redirect the traffic away 
from the local neighborhood 
[24] 
I2. DARPA Red Balloon Challenge – 
false locations of balloon placements 
were submitted across teams 
False locations were submitted across 
the teams  
   False locations’ 
goal was to confuse 
other participants 
Integrity – wrong data 
strongly influenced the 
quality of information 
[10] 
I2. DARPA Shredder Challenge 
required participants to put shredded 
documents together. Some of the 
crowd workers sabotaged the 
initiative by repeatedly undoing the 
work delivered by other crowd 
workers 
A crowd of attackers piled up the 
pieces of the jigsaw and sabotaged 
genuine users’ work making it much 
more complex, as they had first to 
unstack the pieces and then search for 
correct matches 
   Inserted input 
contributed to 
creation of a wrong 
result, long term 
impact of the 
attacks resulted in 
decrease in 
participation  
Integrity violation – 
provided data computed 
false results 
[43] 
I4. Prank designs submitted to Henkel 
challenge – the designs got voted to 
the top ranks and consequently the 
company had to retract public voting 
Intentionally pranked designs 
confused the voting crowd 
 Henkel 
decided to 
sort out some 
suggestions 
 Users had malici-
ously influenced the 
vote; wrong input 
was placed on site 
Integrity – data provided 
resulted in the cancellation 
of the voting 
[19] 
C2. Netflix released hundred million 
anonymized user records as part of its 
“Netflix Prize” Contest. User records 
became known after they were 
combined with other information to 
find the identities of the users in the 
dataset  
   Data, when 
combined 
with exter-
nal informa-
tion disclos-
ed user 
identities 
 Confidentiality – data 
containing identities of the 
contest participants was 
disclosed after being 
combined with publicly 
accessible information 
[53] 
C1. Hacking attack on crowdsourcing 
page to collect sensitive data incl. 
passwords, phone numbers, email 
addresses and credit card numbers 
(Kickstarter) 
   Lack of suf-
ficient secu-
rity measures 
to hacking 
attempt 
 Confidentiality – Kickstarter 
user data was hacked 
[3] 
I4. Mountain Dew Campaign poll was 
bombarded with unusable names 
proposals 
The crowd started posting offensive 
proposals in the contest for a green-
apple infused soft drink name 
   Offensive campaign 
results shut 
initiative down 
Integrity – provided prank 
data forced the organizers to 
close the campaign 
[42] 
C1. Crowdfunding site Patreon was 
hacked for users' names, email, posts, 
and shipping addresses 
   Site's user 
database got 
hacked  
 Confidentiality - hackers 
accessed users' names, email, 
posts, and shipping addresses 
[18]
[2] 
I2. Police officers flooding Waze app 
with false information on their 
activity to make the app's information 
less useful to drivers 
 
The crowd (police) entering fake data 
on Waze app 
    Integrity – false information 
provided aiming to spread 
disinformation 
[5] 
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I3. Botnet attack on Waze Two students created fake Waze 
accounts to create fake traffic jams 
    Integrity – false information 
provided aiming to spread 
disinformation 
[47] 
I4. Internet polls steered off track by 
the voting crowd into outrageous 
results 
E.g. prank responses on polls related to 
naming ships, bridges, products, planets 
or voting for concert spots for musicians 
    Integrity – prank poll 
responses aiming to spread 
disinformation 
[40] 
I3. Robo-voting that skewed public 
polls, e.g. Time 100 Most Influential 
People 
 Polls sabotaged by 
automated scripts 
(bots) that submit-
ted multiple votes 
   Integrity – voting results 
were skewed 
[41]
[30] 
A1. DDoS attack on PopVote, Hong 
Kong Democracy voting website in 
June 2014 
 
 PopVote hosted by 
Amazon Web 
Services, Cloud-
flare and 
UDomain. All 
hosting services hit 
by large scale 
DDoS attacks 
   Availability – the goal was 
to take the website down  
[37] 
A1. Project on Crowdsourced 
Satellite Imagery taken down by 
DDoS attack 
 
 Site sourcing 
images of sensi-
tive geographical 
sites taken down 
by a DDoS attack 
   Availability – the website 
stopped working 
[36] 
A1. Reddit site became unavailable 
because of DDoS attacks 
 
 The website was 
hit with DDoS 
attack 
   Availability - Reddit site 
experienced an outage  
[28] 
I2. Failed hunt for the Boston Bomber After Boston bombing attack, the 
crowd attempted and failed to 
accurately identify the offenders 
   Wrong information 
on suspects on 
Reddit and Twitter 
resulted in crowd 
searching for 
innocent people 
Integrity – wrong input data 
created wrong output and 
resulted for the chase of 
innocent people 
[9] 
I2. SketchFactor application 
crowdsourced crime and public safety 
reporting perceptions, not facts 
 Platform for users 
to browse reports 
of “sketchy” 
behavior and 
crowdsource their 
own stories was 
accused of racism 
and profiling 
   Integrity - the data available 
on SketchFactor compared 
with actual crime data 
revealed few clear overlaps 
[13] 
C2. PatientsLikeMe users’ personal 
data on taken medications and illness 
symptoms was gathered by Nielsen 
Nielsen opened personal accounts on 
the app and copied personal data from 
chatrooms and on bulletin boards. 
    Confidentiality – although 
there was no privacy viola-
tion, Nielsen found a way to 
extract app’s users’ data  
[15] 
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